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In order to evaluate the equitability of a tax system one must look not
only at taxes themselves but, further, to the tax system in relation to the other
burdens imposed and benefits granted by the public sector of the economy.
Taxes are but one way in which governments control income; a meaningful
commentary on the overall equitability of a tax system must, therefore, in-
clude an examination of not only the effects of taxes, but also of the effects
of government expenditures. Failure to examine both of these effects, as well
as their interaction, may lead to misleading and incorrect conclusions when
evaluating the equitability of a given system and, in particular, the degree to
which it promotes or fails to promote overall redistributive equity. For ex-
ample, a tax system which claims a higher percentage as income rises (a
"progressive system"), when combined with government expenditures heavily
biased in favour of the wealthier classes, might promote less redistribution
than the combination of a tax system which holds the percentage of income
claimed for tax constant (a "proportional system") and expenditures made
specifically on behalf of the poor. Severe criticism based upon this idea has
been leveled at the Carter Report;' that report considered equity in terms of
the amorphous concepts of "vertical" and "horizontal" equity which are
defined only with reference to the system of taxation:2
It must be concluded that it is presumptuous of the Carter Commission to claim
that their tax proposals are equitable in any meaningful sense without specifying the
expenditures side of the budget.. .. If the Carter Commission had really been
concerned about equity, they might have recommended greater emphasis on ex-
penditures (even though their terms of reference may have precluded a detailed
analysis of expenditures)... .3
© Copyright, 1978, Morris Coleman.
* Morris Coleman is a member of the 1978 graduating class of Osgoode Hall Law
School of York University.
The author would like to thank Professor Neil Brooks of Osgoode Hall Law School for
his many helpful comments and suggestions.
1 Can. 1 Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation (Carter Report) (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, 1966).
2The Carter Commission asserted that "[e]quity has two dimensions. Horizontal
equity requires that individuals and families in similar circumstances bear the same taxes.
Vertical equity requires that those in different circumstances bear appropriately different
taxes.. .": id. at 4-5.
3 A. Robinson, "The Concept of Equity in the Carter Report," in A. Robinson and
J. Cutt, Canada's Tax Structure and Economic Goals (Toronto: Faculty of Administra-
tive Studies, York University, 1967) at 13.
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It is necessary to consider how equity can be defined taking into account
government expenditures as well as taxes. This broader frame of reference
focuses upon the crucial issue of the degree of overall redistributive equity4
effected by the Canadian public sector rather than the far less significant issue
of the degree of overall vertical equity in the Canadian tax system.
The most recent and rigorous Canadian study is that of Dr. Irwin
Gillespie.5 He treated overall redistributive equity in terms of income redis-
tribution. He concluded that "[d]uring 1969 [the most recent year surveyed
in the study] the total public sector was broadly redistributive from higher
income classes to lower income classes."
This paper will analyze the general approach as well as some of the
assumptions underlying the Gillespie study. While the results of this analysis
do not contradict the trends reflected in Gillespie's conclusions, they do
underline the fact that the degree of these trends should be regarded with
considerable caution.
This paper will also consider overall redistributive equity in terms of the
redistribution of benefits as opposed to the redistribution of income. The con-
cept of the redistribution of benefits takes into account the fact that the value
or worth of a government service or good to a recipient tax unit may vary
with the income of that tax unit. When overall redistributive equity is con-
sidered in terms of redistribution of benefits rather than redistribution of
income, a different picture emerges-the public sector appears to be favour-
ing the rich and the poor at the expense of the middle class.
This paper will be divided into three parts. The first will explain briefly
how the gross cost of the tax system to different income groups can be
measured. The second deals with the problem of quantifying the flow of gov-
ernment expenditures and their benefits to different income groups. The con-
clusions from these parts will be compared in the third.
II. THE GROSS COST OF THE TAX SYSTEM
The gross cost of the tax system to a given group is the total tax that it
actually bears. This is determined by aggregating all the component taxes to
which it is subject. The computation must take into account not only taxes
levied directly on the group but also the effects of tax "shifting"; a tax which
4 Redistributive equity will be considered only in terms of the short-run impact of
the public sector. The long-run impact of the public sector on redistributive equity
through its effects on the distribution of wealth, equality of opportunity, etc., will not
be treated directly.
6 A summary and discussion of the results of this study can be found in 1. Gillespie,
On the Redistribution of Income in Canada (1976), 24 Can. Tax J. 417 [hereinafter
Gillespie].
GId. at 435.
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is levied on the group but actually borne by other groups must be excluded
from the tax burden of the group upon whom the tax was originally levied
and included in the total tax burdens of the groups actually bearing the tax.
For example, that portion of the corporate income which is effectively shifted
to consumers by way of higher prices should be considered to be part of the
consumers' tax burden, rather than part of the tax burden of corporations or
their shareholders (except, of course, to the extent that their shareholders
are also consumers).
The sum of all the component taxes to which a group or tax unit1 is
subject after the shifting, if any, of each such tax has been taken into account
is called the total tax "incidence" on that group or unit.
The "broad income" of a family is essentially a comprehensive measure
of the income of a tax unit excluding the effects of the public sector. It is
composed of the family's money income (excluding government transfer pay-
ments) plus imputed income from such sources as food grown and consumed
on the farm. Also included in broad income are inheritances, gifts, and cer-
tain accrued gains that may not yet have been converted into cash in the
family's hands, such as its share of retained corporate earnings. Direct taxes
should not be subtracted in calculating broad income. Furthermore, indirect
taxes should be added back in when calculating broad income since income
is effectively lessened by the amount of such taxes and broad income is in-
come in the absence of taxes and government expenditures. 8 Since broad
income excludes the effects of the public sector, it is a comprehensive meas-
ure of income before tax (and before government expenditures). The total
effective rate of tax on families with money incomes within a given range is
7 The family is assumed to be the tax unit in this paper.
8 A quantitative example of the calculation of broad income can be found in
Gillespie, supra note 5, at 444 (Table A-6-Estimation of Income Concepts, Canada,
1969). Unfortunately, Gillespie omits to add back certain indirect taxes such as the shifted
portion of the corporate income tax and the federal sales tax levied at the manufacturing
level. Consequently, Gillespie generally underestimated broad income by about 15 per-
cent. In this paper, this underestimation has been corrected by adding the indirect business
taxes paid by each income class to Gillespie's estimate of their broad income. The re-
sultant sums are the estimates of broad income used in this paper. The added-in factor
of indirect business taxes corresponds to the concept of "hidden purchasing power loss"
found in: M. Walker, ed., How Much Tax Do You Really Pay? (Vancouver: Fraser
Institute, 1976). The estimation of income concepts in the technical report underlying
that book (see: S. Star and S. Pipes, Income and Taxation in Canada, 1961-75 (Fraser
Institute Technical Report 76-01) (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1976)) corresponds closely
to Gillespie's estimates. Thus, it was possible to derive from that technical report an
appropriate series of factors representing indirect business taxes that could be added to
Gillespie's broad income estimates. This was done by taking the difference of lines 38
(Total Full Income Plus Indirect Business Taxes) and 29 (Full Income) of Table 3-4,
found at pages 38(a) and 38 of that technical report.
It should be noted that any attempt to measure income excluding the effects of the
public sector will suffer from the problem of how to properly exclude indirect effects of
the government on income through such factors as legislation affecting equality of oppor-
tunity and the impact of the public sector on the size of the total income "pie!' available.
1978]
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defined as the ratio of the total tax incidence on them to their aggregate
broad income.9
The concepts of tax incidence and the total effective rate of tax will be
indispensable in the portion of this paper that deals with the interaction of
taxes and the flow of government expenditures and their benefits. Bearing in
mind the previously discussed qualifications upon the significance of an
analysis of tax incidence in isolation, it is interesting to briefly consider some
of the patterns that emerge when the technique just described is used to
calculate effective tax rates (see Table 1 ).10
We see, for example, that personal income tax1 (lines 1 and 9 of the
table) is mildly progressive over all income classes. The corporate income
9 This definition can be illustrated as follows:
Assume that the tax mix is made up of "in" different types of taxes (e.g., personal
income tax, corporate income tax, sales tax, etc.) and that we have divided family money
income into "n" different classes. Let "i" represent the "ij i ' type of tax (l__9i-,m) and
"j" represent the -jth,, family money income class (l'jmn).
Let t1J represent the tax incidence on the jth money income class of the it" type
of tax. If we let aggregate broad income for the jth family money income class equal
"Yj", then the ratio tij (x 100)/Y, gives the effective tax rate (in percentage terms)
of the ith type of the tax on the jth family money income class. Similarly, where
t1j=Tj; Tj (x 100)/Y, equals the total effective tax rate (in percentage terms) of the
whole tax mix on the jth money income class (which, of course, is the same as the
average total effective tax rate of the whole tax mix on a tax unit in the jut money
income class).
lO This table is derived directly from Gillespie's Table 1-Tax Incidence: Effective
Tax Rates Using the Broad Income Concept, Canada, 1969, supra note 5, at 424. Since
the table shows 1969 results, classes appear unrealistically low when we look at them
now. In order to put the income class indices in perspective, they are also shown in
terms of 1969 percentage and percentile distributions taken from line 2 of Gillespie's
Table A-6-Estimation of Income Concepts, Canada, 1969, supra note 5, at 444.
The effective tax rates in Gillespie's table are higher than those in the table of
effective tax rates shown in this paper. This is due solely to the fact that our estimates
of broad income (the denominator of effective tax rates) are larger than Gillespie's, as
explained in note 8, supra. Our Table 1 embodies the same trends and tax shifting
assumptions as Gillespie's Table 1.
Regarding the effects of shifting, Gillespie qualifies his use of "standard shifting
assumptions" (which are justified only as being "based on fairly widespread acceptance in
the literature": Supra note 5, at 423, n. 9) as follows:
.. . Experimentation with alternative shifting hypotheses for taxes (about which
there is still some debate in the literature) resulted in no change in the general
pattern of total tax incidence, although there was some change in the magnitudes
of effective tax rates. If it is assumed that the corporate profits tax is borne en-
tirely by shareowners, total tax incidence is less regressive over the lower income
brackets and slightly less regressive over the upper income brackets. If it is
assumed that sales and excise taxes are borne by factory owners, total tax inci-
dence is considerably less regressive over the lower income brackets and virtually
proportional over the upper income brackets. If it is assumed that the share of
property tax failing on renter-occupied housing units is borne by the landlord
rather than by the tenant, total tax incidence is slightly less regressive over the
upper income brackets.
11 It is assumed that personal income tax is not shifted: Gillespie, supra note 5, at
441 (Table A-5-Shifting Assumptions for Fiscal Incidence Study).
[VOL. 16, NO. 1
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tax' (lines 2 and 10) is regressive up to a family money income level of
$6,000. Gillespie concludes that:
... The regressivity [of the corporate income tax] over the lower income brackets
is caused partly by the portion of the tax that is assumed to be shifted forward to
consumers, and partly by the fact that family units in the lowest income brackets
(probably the retired elderly), own a larger proportion of corporate shares than
those in the middle income brackets do.13
Above an income level of $6,000 it would seem reasonable to infer that
the pattern of incidence of the corporate income tax is the result of two
counter-balancing forces:
i) Wealthier families tend to spend a lower proportion of their income
on consumption. Thus, the amount of corporate income tax that has
been shifted forward to wealthier consumers will generally be lower
relative to their income than in the case of poorer families. This
tends to militate against the progressivity of the corporate income
tax;
ii) The proportion of corporate shares owned by middle and upper
income families tends to rise with income. This would increase the
progressivity (or reduce the regressivity, as the case may be) of the
corporate income tax.
The combined effect of these factors does not produce an unambiguous
trend except where the income level exceeds $15,000. Here factor (ii) ap-
pears to predominate to raise the effective rate of corporate income tax paid
by this group above that paid by the middle and upper-middle income
groups. It is still less than the effective rate of corporate income tax on the
group below an income level of $2,000, however, and equal to that of the
income group between $2,000 and $3,000.
Property tax (line 19)14 is regressive over all income levels. Sales tax
(lines 3 and 11)' 5 and selective excise taxes (lines 4 and 12)10 are generally
12 One half of the corporate income tax is assumed to be borne by the shareholders
and is distributed pro rata on the basis of dividend income, i.e. the "distributive series"
is dividend income, and the other half is assumed to be shifted forward to consumers
(distributive series: total consumption): id.
13 Id. at 423.
14 It is assumed that property tax on land is borne by the owners of the land (the
distributive series for land used for business is dividend income; for land used for
farming it is farming income; and for residential land it is rental income). Property tax
on business improvements is assumed to be borne by consumers (distributive series:
total consumption) and property tax on farm improvements is assumed to be borne by
consumers of food (distributive series: consumption of food). Property tax on improve-
ments on owner-occupied residence is assumed to be borne by the owners (distributive
series: value of owned homes) whereas such tax on renter-occupied units is assumed to
be borne by renters (distributive series: rent expenditures): id. at 441 (Table A-5-
Shifting Assumptions for Fiscal Incidence Study).
15 It is assumed that federal and provincial sales tax is borne by consumers of
taxed items (distributive series: consumption of commodities subject to federal and
provincial sales tax, respectively): id.
10 Excise taxes are assumed to be borne by consumers of the goods on which they
are levied in proportion to the consumption of such goods by each income class: id.
(VOL. 16, NO. I
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regressive at both the federal and provincial levels although proportionality,
with some variation, is exhibited between the income levels of $5,000 and
$15,000. More importantly, this pattern is followed by the effective tax inci-
dence of the whole tax mix (line 24: "Total All Taxes"). This is not sur-
prising since the generally regressive taxes such as corporate income tax,
property tax, sales tax and selective excise taxes accounted for 50 percent
of total tax payments in Canada in 1969 (versus 30 percent for personal
income tax).17 Thus, the weight of generally regressive taxes in the tax mix
is sufficient to enable their regressiveness to predominate, by and large, over
the mild progressivity of personal income tax. The Carter Commission's
recommendation that the effective progressivity as well as the weight of
personal income tax in the tax mix be increased' s might serve to promote
vertical equity. As will be seen, however, the implementation of these recom-
mendations may, in itself, have little effect on overall redistributive equity,
i.e., the redistribution that is effected when both taxes and government ex-
penditures are taken into account.
Il. THE FLOW OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES AND THEIR
BENEFITS
The concept of expenditure incidence is analogous to that of tax inci-
dence. It can be used to determine the magnitude of the flow of expenditures
from the government to those being governed. The total expenditure inci-
dence on a given group is simply the total government expenditures made
for their benefit.
Since the Gillespie study was concerned with the redistribution of in-
come, it dealt with government expenditures in terms of expenditure inci-
dence. An alternative measure of overall redistributive equity can be derived
if government expenditures are dealt with using the concept of benefit inci-
dence rather than expenditure incidence.
The concept of benefit incidence goes a step further than expenditure
incidence. Whereas expenditure incidence is defined in terms of the cost to
the government of providing benefits, benefit incidence is defined in terms
of the value or worth (in money terms) to the recipient of benefits provided.
The cost to the government of providing a given amount of goods or service
will generally not vary with the income of the recipient; however, the value
or worth (in money terms) of a good or service to the recipient tax unit will
often vary with the income of the recipient. For example, assume that gov-
ernment funding for public schools ceased and that schools were completely
taken over by private enterprise. Even if poorer families generally attached
the same importance to education as wealthier families, the latter would tend
to be willing to pay more to ensure that their children received a good
education. Naturally, this would be because wealthier families have more
money at their disposition to spend on education. Thus, we would expect the
17Id. at 437 (Table A-2-Total Tax Payments, Canada, 1969).
18 2 Carter Report, supra note 1, at 266.
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value of education (in money terms) to generally increase with the income
of the family unit. It should be noted, however, that this relationship may not
hold in cases where private market substitutes are used. For example, the
value (in money terms) of having a public school nearby may be negligible
to a wealthy family that sends its children to a private school, whereas to a
poorer family whose children attend the public school its value may be
substantial.
Having distinguished expenditure incidence and benefit incidence, we
consider first expenditure incidence. In order to quantify expenditure inci-
dence, it is necessary to ascertain the portion of government expenditures the
benefit of which is actually received by families in each income class. Gov-
ernment expenditures may be broadly divided into two categories for this
purpose.
The first category includes all "specific" expenditures for which the flow
of primary benefits to the recipient is directly traceable. In Gillespie's paper,
the hypotheses used to distribute the ultimate incidence of such directly
traceable expenditures are based upon the incidence of use of the benefits
flowing from such expenditures.19
For example, the proportion of total expenditures on elementary and
post-secondary education deemed to be received by a given family money
income class is equal to the ratio of students in such families benefiting from
such expenditures to the total number of students from all family money
income classes benefiting from such expenditures. The allocation of specific
expenditures based on use has generally been refined to the point where the
probability of significant errors in the estimation of total expenditure incidence
using such a basis for allocation is small. This is not to suggest that the hypothe-
ses used approach perfection. They still suffer from the tendency to exclude
altogether effects which are difficult to quantify, such as the indirect benefits
accruing to society from such services as education and public health.
The second category of government expenditures includes all "general"
expenditures on "pure" public goods such as defence and the police. Obvi-
ously, it is most difficult to analyze the allocation of such expenditures on
the basis of incidence of use. Most general expenditures protect both life and
property. To the extent that they protect property, they are directed more
heavily toward upper income families and their incidence should be distrib-
uted accordingly; however, to the extent that their importance is perceived
in terms of protecting the life and personal security (as opposed to the
property) of Canadians, it is more appropriate to view general expenditures
as being directed equally at families in all income classes. This latter view
is adopted in this paper and it is assumed that the portion of general expendi-
tures which should properly be viewed as protecting property is minimal rela-
tive to that portion which should be viewed as protecting life. Thus, in determin-
ing expenditure incidence, general expenditures have been distributed equally
across tax units without regard to their income class.2 0 Admittedly, this is a
19 These hypotheses are clearly specified in Gillespie's paper, supra note 5, at 442
(Table A-5--Shifting Assumptions for Fiscal Incidence Study).
20 Since the concern here is with the average family in each income class, the effects
[VOL. 16, NO. 1
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simplification since some portion of general expenditures should be allocated
on the basis of the property held by each income class. For this reason, we
will later consider how the measurement of expenditure incidence might be
altered if general expenditures were allocated in proportion to broad income
rather than equally across tax units.
Indeed, in deriving "expenditure" incidence, Gillespie assumed "that
family units benefit from 'general' expenditures in proportion to their broad
incomes." 21 Unfortunately, the assumption appears to have been based on
some confusion between the concepts of expenditure incidence and benefit
incidence. Gillespie suggests that the general approach used in this paper
to allocate benefits (which will be discussed shortly) might be characterized
as "a more rigorous methodology for allocating the benefits of pure public
goods among family units."22 He applies this methodology as an alternative
assumption to distribute general expenditures for the purposes of calculating
expenditure incidence.23 It appears inconsistent and inappropriate to treat
general expenditures in terms of benefit incidence when one is ultimately
seeking expenditure incidence.
24
It is easy to define a parameter that gives a measure of total expenditure
incidence relative to broad income analogously to the definition of a total
effective tax rate. Thus, the total effective expenditure rate on families within
a given money income class is defined as the total expenditure incidence on
such families divided by their aggregrate broad income.25
of differing family sizes on the distribution of general expenditures across different
family money income classes would be small except where the average family size in
an income class deviated substantially from the norm.
2l Gillespie, supra note 5, at 428. It should be noted that Gillespie also derived
expenditure incidence using several alternative approaches including one in which it was
"assumed that family units benefit equally [from general expenditures]": Id. Gillespie's
estimates of expenditure incidence when this alternative approach is used is from his
Table A-10-Total Expenditure Incidence for Alternative General Expenditure Hypo-
theses Using the Broad Income Base, Canada, 1969, supra note 5, at 449. The effects
on expenditure incidence of this approach to distributing general expenditures will be
considered later.
22 id. at 428.
2 Id. at 449 (Table A-10-Total Expenditure Incidence for Alternative General
Expenditure Hypothesis Using the Broad Income Base, Canada, 1969, at line 5).
24 Even if it was appropriate to consider benefit incidence in this context and apply
the "more rigorous" Aaron-McGuire methodology, [See, H. Aaron and M. McGuire,
Efficiency and Equity in the Optimal Supply of a Public Good (1969), 51 Review of
Economics and Statistics 31], the results in line 5 of Gillespie's Table A-1b--Total
Expenditure Incidence for Alternative General Expenditure Hypothesis Using the Broad
Income Base, Canada, 1969: Id., would be much less regressive than those of line 4 of
that table if assumptions similar to those in Part IV of this paper were made.
25 See, note 9, supra, for an explanation of how component taxes can be aggregated
in order to arrive at a set of total effective tax rates. The actual calculation of total
effective expenditure rates involves a similar treatment of component expenditures after
they have been categorised and allocated using the approach that has been dealt with
in this section of the paper. As was done with taxes, component expenditures at the
federal, provincial and municipal levels of government are analysed. The estimates of
total expenditure incidence and total effective expenditure rates given in Table 2 of this
paper follow from Gillespie's estimates of expenditure rates. However, the measure
of broad income discussed in note 8, supra, has been used in lieu of Gillespie's measure
to calculate total effective expenditure rates.
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Naturally, when we turn from expenditure incidence to the analysis of
benefit incidence the crucial problem becomes how to meaningfully distribute
the incidence of benefits flowing from government goods and services across
different income classes. Benefit incidence is defined in terms of the value or
worth (in money terms) of government goods and services to the recipient
tax unit. As was mentioned earlier, the value or worth of certain government
goods and services, such as education, will tend to rise with the income class
of the recipient. The method in the Appendix attempts to quantify this gen-
eral tendency. There are numerous difficulties inherent in this method. The
most serious of these are discussed in the Appendix. The benefit incidence
results that follow from the Appendix are translated into total effective benefit
rates in the same manner that total expenditure incidence results are trans-
lated into total effective expenditure rates. Thus, the total effective benefit
rate on families within a given money income class is defined as the ratio of
their total benefit incidence to their aggregate broad income.
IV. THE COMPARISON OF TAX INCIDENCE WITH EXPENDITURE
INCIDENCE AND BENEFIT INCIDENCE
Given the preceding framework, it is now possible to compare total ex-
penditures and benefits to total taxes. The average total tax incidence is sub-
tracted from the respective total average expenditure incidence of a family
money income class. The result (average net fiscal incidence on that family
money income class) indicates the degree and direction of redistribution of
income effected by the public sector with respect to the average tax unit
in that class.
Another measure of the degree and direction of redistribution of income
by the public sector is the effective fiscal incidence rate of a given class, i.e.,
its total effective expenditure rate less its total effective tax rate. This is equi-
valent to its average net fiscal incidence over its average broad income.
Average net fiscal incidence is expressed in money terms, whereas effec-
tive fiscal incidence rates are expressed as a unitless fraction or percentage
(which may exceed one or one hundred percent respectively). Quite naturally,
the magnitude of either measure of fiscal incidence for a given family money
income class will reflect the magnitude of redistribution of income by the
public sector with respect to that class. A value of either measure greater
(less) than zero will indicate a redistribution of income towards (away from)
that class.
On the other hand, in order to compare average tax incidence on a
family money income class, which, of course, reflects the average "cost" of
the public sector to that class, with the average benefits that class derives
from the public sector, we must consider the effect of benefit incidence rather
than expenditure incidence. Clearly, such a cost-benefit comparison is crucial
to any attempt to evaluate the overall equitability of the tax system.
Thus, substracting the average total tax incidence of a given class from
its average total benefit incidence yields its average total net benefit incidence
(which is in money terms). Subtracting its total effective tax rate from its
total effective benefit rate yields the class net effective benefit rate (expressed
202 [VOL. 16, NO. I
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in percentage terms). For example, if the average tax unit in the class were
taxed according to what the marginal benefits accruing to it from the public
sector were worth to it,2 6 then the net marginal benefits (which take into ac-
count taxes paid) received by that tax unit would be zero. This would be
reflected by an average total net benefit incidence and a net effective benefit
rate both equal to zero. If these parameters had a value greater than zero for
a given family money income class, this would correspond to positive net
benefits flowing to this class from the public sector. Of course, the converse
would hold true in cases where the value of these parameters was less than
zero.
Estimations of the parameters discussed previously are summarized in
Table 2.
The patterns emerging from Table 2 are clear. For example, comparing
lines 3 and 4 to line 6 we see that either measure of total effective expenditure
rates discussed previously in this paper has a significantly more regressive
pattern than total effective benefit rates. 27 In fact, the total effective benefit
rate for tax units in the highest income class2 8 is progressive with respect to
that of the next highest income class.
Naturally, these results are reflected by a pattern of net effective benefit
rates (line 6A) less regressive than that of effective fiscal incidence rates. The
patterns of effective fiscal incidence rates in both lines 3A and 4A of Table 2
indicate that the public sector is effecting a redistribution of income primarily
towards family units with money income of less than $7,000 a year at the
expense of those with a money income exceeding $10,000 a year; both indi-
cate that the expense of this income redistribution to those with a money in-
come over $10,000 a year increases with income.2 Naturally, the amount of
income redistributed, particularly to the poorest income classes, appears
greater if general expenditures are distributed evenly across all family units
(lines 2, 2A, 4, and 4A) rather than in proportion to income (lines 1, IA,
3, and 3A).
On the other hand, net effective benefit rates (line 6A) are positive for
family units with money income of less than $6,000 or greater than $15,000
a year, indicating a net flow of benefits to these family units. The net effective
benefit rate for the $6,000 to $6,999 income class is close to zero, indicating
that the total tax burden imposed on the "average" unit in the group will tend
2 6 Taxes are set in this way under the benefit principle.
2 7 Since a regressive rate is one that declines as income increases, a more regressive
expenditure or benefit rate is more favourable to those in lower income brackets.
28 This rate, however, must be treated with particular caution for the reasons men-
tioned in the Appendix.
29 Gillespie suggests that this increase would probably be proportional if general
expenditures were allocated as in line 3 of Table 2 since "the difference between the two
effective fiscal incidence rates over the highest two brackets are [sic] probably not
significant." Supra note 5, at 430. If this conclusion is valid, it would apply equally well
to the results in line 3 of our Table 2. Furthermore, it would imply that the expense
of income redistribution to those with a money income over $10,000 would increase in a
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to be commensurate with the imputed marginal benefits accruing to it from
the public sector.80
Net effective benefit rates are negative for family units with money in-
come ranging from $7,000 to $15,000 a year, implying that the public sector
acts to the detriment of these middle and upper middle income groups (in
terms of the net flow of benefits.) 8 1 Probably, this detriment was more pro-
nounced in the late 1960's than earlier in that decade,82 although it is unclear
whether or not this trend has continued into the 1970's.
One of the most striking aspects of Table 2 is that the average total net
benefit incidence (line 5A) is greatest for family units with money income
exceeding $15,000 a year. Thus the net benefits flowing to this income class
(i.e., units with family money income in the top 8 percent of all units) is
greater than for any other income class.
It is probable that the patterns emerging from Table 2 have not changed
substantially in the 1970's, although there is insufficient data to verify this.
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This analysis of the redistributive impact of the public sector in terms of
the net flow of benefits has underlined the fact that the overall redistributive
equity effected by the Canadian public sector may well be less than satisfac-
tory. It is apparent that the degree of overall redistributive equity that could
be theoretically attained through the use of the tax system is substantially
constrained by other objectives of the tax system that, in some circumstances,
conflict with equity. Greater coordination of taxation and government expen-
ditures would be most desirable since it would often then be possible to re-
duce the equitability of the tax system component of the public sector in order
to facilitate the realization of other objectives while compensating for the
resultant functional inequalities in the tax system by appropriate modification
in the pattern and nature of government expenditures. This approach would
enable the desired degree of overall redistributive equity to be realized in the
most efficient possible manner.
30 Thus its tax burden is roughly equal to what it would be if it had been set under
the benefit principle.
- 1 Family units with money income ranging from $7,000 to $15,000 ranged from
the 52nd to the 92nd percentile in income distribution in 1969: Gillespie, supra note 5,
at 444 (Table A-6-Estmation of Income Concepts, Canada, 1969).
82 This follows from the comparisons of money redistribution effected by the public
sector in 1961 and 1969. The results are discussed in Gillespie, supra note 5, at 431-35.
83 Id.
APPENDIX: AN APPROACH TO QUANTIFYING
BENEFIT INCIDENCE
Under the benefit principle, the cost of the public sector to the tax unit
(tax incidence) is generally equated with the imputed benefits that the tax
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unit derives from it.' Making a number of assumptions which will be dis-
cussed, these imputed benefits can be quantified as follows:
Let:
t(y) - tax price (set on the basis of the benefit principle) in money
terms per unit of public goods to an individual with a dispos-
able income of "y" (Thus, tax price reflects tax rates.);
Mu(y)- the taxpayer's marginal utility of disposable income, and
Mu(g)= the taxpayer's marginal utility of public goods, where "g" is
a scalar measure of the "g" vector [g1, g ..... g]. )"gn" is
the quantity of the "nth" public good available to him and "p"
the number of types of public goods available.
The benefit principle can then be stated in the equivalent mathematical form:2
t(y) " Mu(y) = Mu(g) [It is assumed that Mu(y) exceeds zero] (1)
We now proceed to expand this principle into a benefit theory useful in mea-
suring the benefits received by an individual taxpayer from the public sector.
Equation (1) implies:
g * t(y)=g * Mu(g)/Mu(y) (2)
"g * t(y)" is the total effective taxes paid by the individual in question under
the benefit principle for the benefits he derives from public goods. Thus
"g * t(y)" is equivalent to his imputed benefits from the public sector. As-
suming Mu(g) is constant for all income groups, 3 it follows that imputed
benefits from the public sector are inversely proportional to the marginal
utility of disposable income. In itself, this relationship is not very useful.
However, if Mu(y) can be quantified, we can achieve some understand-
ing of whether imputed benefits of public goods as a proportion of income
rise or fall (or as Gillespie assumed for pure public goods, remain constant)
as income rises. Aaron and McGuire4 suggest that the marginal utility of dis-
posable income can be approximated by
Mu(y) = ay-e (3)
where "a" is a constant greater than zero and "0" is the elasticity of marginal
utility with respect to income.3 Combining equations (2) and (3) and divid-
ing by "y" yields:
g • t(y) g ° Mu(g) * ye-1
y a
I The equation of costs and benefits of the public sector under the benefit principle
serves only as a point of reference. In reality, such costs and benefits are not generally
equated.
2The mathematical approach embodied in equations (1) to (4) of this appendix
was used in S. Maitel, Is Redistributive Taxation a Myth? (Queen's University Institute
for Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 122, Mimeo, 1973) at 4-5.
3 This assumption will be discussed shortly.
4See H. Aaron and M. McGuire, Efficiency and Equity in the Optimal Supply of a
Public Good (1969), 51 Review of Economics and Statistics 31.
r Which is the ratio of percentage change in marginal utility of income to per-
centage change in income.
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It can be shown that "0" can be quite reliably estimated." Estimates
indicate that "0" has a value of 1.55 in Canada and tends to be in this range
or higher for other non-communist countries.7 Since "0" has a value substan-
tially greater than one (proportionally speaking), equation (4) implies that
the ratio of benefits over income increases at a substantial rate as income
rises. This means that if all public goods to which equation (4) applies were
distributed equally among the populace (in money terms), then the tax
rates set with respect to such goods on the basis of the benefit principle would
have to be progressive. 8
It is important to bear in mind the key assumptions underlying this
analysis:
(1) The principle of horizontal equity is adhered to in the conventional
sense so that the tax prices (which reflect tax rates) of two individuals in the
same economic position under the above model, i.e. with the same "g" and
'", would be the same even if their respective preference schedules were
different. This is so because of the combined effect of two assumptions. First,
equation (3) makes it clear that under the model Mu(y) will not vary unless
"y" does. Second, Mu(g) is assumed to be invariant with respect to all factors
except "g". Failure to disregard such differences in their preference schedules
over the relevant range of "y" and "g" could result in individuals in the same
or similar economic positions being taxed at very different rates.
(2) It has been assumed that Mu(g) is independent of "y". This
would not be appropriate for the component goods of the "g" vector which
were complementary to private goods (e.g., highways and cars). The marginal
utility of a given bundle of such goods would tend to increase with income
rather than staying constant. Naturally, in the case of public goods where
such a complementary relationship existed with private goods, the preceding
model would tend to understate the benefits accruing to upper income classes.
Conversely, in the case of public goods which are substitutes for private
goods (e.g., public television and movies), this bias would be reversed in cases
where the consumption of the private good substitute tended to rise with in-
come as this rise, in turn, would tend to lower the marginal utility of the cor-
responding public good. Thus, it would be senseless to apply equation (4)
to transfer payments. Clearly, they should be excluded from the "g" vector
and treated separately by equating costs to benefits in simple money terms
as would be done if expenditure incidence were to be equated with tax
incidence.
On the other hand, the consumption of private good substitutes would
not rise substantially with income where demand for goods of that genre was
0See A. Powell, Post-War Consumption in Canada: A First Look at the Aggre-
gates, 31 Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 1965, at 559.
7 Id.
8 Using an alternative approach, it can also be shown that this proposition follows
(still with the condition that "0" exceeds one) under a system where the total absolute
sacrifice of individual (tax unit) utility as a result of taxation is equal for all units or
increases with income: see R. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1959) at 100.
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relatively inelastic and was adequately supplied by the public sector. Exclud-
ing transfer payments, most of the specific government expenditures are made
on goods such as these (e.g., education and public health). The marginal
utility of such public goods would not tend to change substantially with in-
come and thus they can reasonably be treated using the preceding analysis.
The primary difficulties in applying the model in the Canadian con-
text are the estimation of Mu(y) and Mu(g). The model is framed in terms
of the individual. For our purposes, however, the tax unit has been treated
as the family rather than the individual. Adherence to micro-economic theory
would generally preclude the possibility of aggregating the preference func-
tions of the individuals within a family in order to arrive at a set of family
preference functions. Fortunately, this is not necessary since under assump-
tion (1), the model is bound by the dictates of the conventional concept of
horizontal equity. There is no attempt to make inter-personal utility compari-
sons. The concern here is simply with obtaining approximate, relative, and
average measures of Mu(g) and Mu(y) for each family money income class.
Clearly, this is all that equation (3) purports to do with respect to Mu(y).
In order to obtain such a measure of Mu(g), several steps were used.
First, it was necessary to find a measure of the "g" vector. To do this, trans-
fer payments were first excluded from it for the reasons mentioned in assump-
tion (2). It was translated into a single number for each family money
income class by taking the total expenditure incidence, excluding transfer pay-
ments, for the average family in each class. To the extent that family units
would like to see a re-allocation of the government expenditures currently
benefitting them, this measure of the "g" vector would tend to be an over-
estimate. Applying this technique we arrive at the following measure of "g":
TABLE A-g,,
(rounded to the nearest hundred dollars)
Family money income class
under $2000 $3000 $4000 $5000 $6000 $7000 $10000 $15000
$2000 -$2999 -$3999 -$4999 -$5999 -$6999 -$9999 -$14999 & Over
2300 2700 3000 3200 3200 3500 3600 3700 5300
The relative differences in these values are not substantial except for
the lowest (less than $2,000 per year) and highest (greater than $15,000 per
year) family money income classes. Even in the case of these extreme values,
the variation from the mean does not exceed 60 percent. The curve Mu(g)-kg-
(where "k" is a constant) corresponds with the probable general shape of
the Mu(g) curve.9 Since the range in the relative values of "g" in Table A is
not great, it appears that taking relative values of Mu(g) that are inversely
proportional to these values of "g" will not introduce substantial error. Never-
9 We would generally expect the marginal utility of public goods to decrease (at a
diminishing rate) as "g" rose. Thus the Mu(g) curve is probably generally convex with
respect to the origin with the co-ordinates of all points along the curve exceeding zero.
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theless, the final benefit incidence results for the poorest and wealthiest in-
come classes should be regarded with particular caution due to the wider
range of the value of "g" in these cases.
Adjusted broad income is a comprehensive measure of income that takes
into account the effects of the public sector. It is defined as broad income less
total taxes plus total expenditure incidence. Adjusted broad income with
general expenditures being distributed evenly across all family units has been
used as a measure of the parameter "y". Strictly speaking, this does not con-
form with the definition of disposable income. For example, it is clear that
the marginal utility of a given net amount of actual disposable income would
generally be less to any individual who had all his needs satisfied by govern-
ment services. Nevertheless, it must be conceded that the measure of "y"
chosen here does have two possibly significant weaknesses. First, as discussed
in Part I of this paper, it is not entirely appropriate to distribute general
expenditure evenly over all family units as has been done to arrive at a meas-
ure of adjusted broad income. Second, while it is clear that Mu(y) will gen-
erally depend on such factors as various forms of imputed income, it is not
clear how these factors will affect Mu(y) relative to the effect of actual dis-
posable income. Thus, using adjusted broad income as a measure of "y"
assumes that all the components of "y" have a homogeneous effect on Mu(y).
The model and assumptions in this appendix have been applied to the
appropriate data' 0 to derive a relative measure of the distribution of benefits
from government expenditures across family money income classes. These
relative values were converted into notional money terms by multiplying them
all by a constant such that their sum after this multiplication would equal
their total cost." The respective incidences of transfer payments to which
this model was not applied were then added to the resultant figures. The final
' Table 2 (line 2) of this paper, as well as Table A-6-Estimation of Income
Concepts in Canada, 1969, found in Gillespie, supra note 5, at 444. The modified
measure of broad income discussed in footnote 8 in the body of this paper has been
used.
"1 Thus, total imputed benefits have been equated with their total cost. In fact, it
is likely that imputed benefits deviate from their total cost. Unfortunately, neither the
extent nor the direction of this deviation has been ascertained. If total imputed benefits
exceeded their total cost (e.g., due to a prevalence of positive externalities arising from
government expenditures), then, of course, the assumption equating total benefits with
their total cost would result, on the average, in the benefits flowing to tax units from
the public sector being underestimated. Conversely, if total government expenditures
exceeded the benefits flowing from them, then, on the average, this assumption would
result in benefits being overestimated.
Even if total imputed benefits deviated significantly from their cost, the trends in
the distribution of benefits across income classes would remain unchanged unless the
ratio of such deviation to expenditure incidence in each income class varied substan-
tially across income classes. It should be borne in mind, however, that although trends
in the distribution of benefits may remain unchanged, errors in the estimation of their
magnitude could still result in positive values of the average total net benefit incidence
and the net effective benefit rate being derived where the values should be negative and
vice versa. This would most likely occur, if at all, in income classes where the estimates
of the average total net benefit incidence and the net effective benefit rate were rela-
tively close to zero.
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results provide a measure of total benefit incidence. These benefit incidence
results are translated into total effective benfit rates in the same manner that
total expenditure incidence results are translated into total effective expendi-
ture rates. Thus, the total effective benefit rate on families within a given
money income class is defined as the ratio of the total benefit incidence on
them to their aggregate broad income.
Admittedly the approach used in this appendix has many weaknesses.
Some of these could be remedied by further refining the approach whereas
others are due to problems inherent in the quantification of benefit incidence
that are not fully resolvable. Clearly, the results following from this appendix
are approximate. Nevertheless, it appears likely that the pattern of the results
does not deviate unreasonably from the patterns they have been designed
to measure. Thus, given the crucial role of benefit incidence as a tool to
measure overall redistributive equity, it would seem justifiable to apply these
tentative results (at least until more refined results become available) as is
done in Part IV of the paper.

